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Abstract 
Contemporary society is replete with myriad social, economic, political 
problems and various forms of immorality. Every society desires order 
and peace hence many scholars (Vico, Hobbes, and Machiavelli, to 
mention a few) have attempted to locate the source of these malaises. 
A close analysis of some of their arguments indicates that social 
disorder, which is the hallmark of immorality, is a product of ‘dirty 
hands’ rooted in the human condition. A further scrutiny of this view 
vis-a-vis contemporary Nigerian socio-politics is the imperative of this 
paper; and we shall conclude that we can manage it by fighting to stop 
some of its undesirable consequences, but above all we must learn to 
live with this necessary evil despite the fact that Aquinas maintains that 
it is contrary to the order of reasonableness. 
 
Whatever is contrary to the order of reason is 
contrary to the nature being as such, and what is 
reasonable is in accordance with human nature as 
such. The good of the human being is in accord 
with reason, and human evil is being outside the 
order of reasonableness... so human virtue which 
make good both the human person and his works, is 
in accordance with human nature just in so far as it 
is in accordance with reason, and vice is contrary 
to human nature just in so far as, it is contrary to 
the order of reasonableness. (ST, 1-11, g.71, a.2c) 
 
Introduction 
Human nature, ‘dirty hands’ and social order or disorder are so 
interwoven or intertwined in the world today that it becomes necessary 
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to refer to them as ‘human condition’. Machiavelli explicitly casts 
doubts upon the unity of the virtues, at one point, when he insists that 
it is not possible (especially for a prince) to observe all the virtues 
because human condition does not permit it (Machiavelli, 1988). What 
is human condition? Is it patterned after human nature? What is human 
nature? Is it egotistic, as Hobbes, Machiavelli and Vico would want us 
to believe, or is it virtuous as Aristotle and the other Christian 
apologists suggest? Today there is greater insistence on the normative 
scope of ordering the society based on a rather exaggerated elevated 
conception of human nature rather than on its empirical/descriptive 
commonsensical aspect. This should not be so. 
     As the long history of moral conflict now makes clear to us, the 
idea of a single human function is mistaken. Human beings are not like 
tack-hammers or pruning knives, any more than they are like pieces of 
blank paper. Their natural needs do not converge inevitably and 
harmoniously to single pre-set aim. Instead, the needs tend to conflict, 
and the various ways of life which different cultures and individuals 
devise  are varying attempts to harmonise them, always imperfect 
ones. When this imperfection becomes specially glaring, people look 
behind their traditional morality to find a principle by which to amend 
it.  
     In this paper, we shall be swimming against the tide; we shall insist 
that the ordering of society based on Aristotelian conception of human 
nature, the good life and virtue does not necessarily lead to the best 
successful life for the individual as well as the society. Our aim here 
rather is to show that a patient understanding of Hobbes, Machiavelli, 
and Vico in the context of commonsensical appreciation of human 
nature would suggest a better alternative as to how society should be 
ordered. The philosophies of Vico, Hobbes and Machiavelli, may lead 
to ‘dirty hands’ but this is merely the human condition. The social 
order or disorder has to be dependent on it. This paper therefore 
divides itself into three sections namely, (1) The human nature in the 
light of Aristotle’s virtue theory ,(2) Human nature in the lights of 
Vico, Hobbes and Machiavelli’s moral cum political thoughts, (3) a 
critique of both Views in the context of politics of “dirty hands” with 
references to Nigeria socio-political situation. 
 




I. Human Nature in the Light of Aristotle’s Virtue Theory. 
Presently, virtue theory which is derived from Aristotle’s moral 
philosophy has become increasingly popular as an alternative both to 
deontological theories such as Kant’s and to consequentialist such as 
Mill`s utilitarianism. Aristotle thought that virtues are qualities of a 
person that help him to flourish or ‘’live well’’. By this, he meant “in 
accordance with human nature” (Aristotle, 1980, 38). Human nature is 
the possession of certain capacities and the value of using them. It does 
not depend on accepting as binding the intentions of a creator who has 
put them there (Midaly, 1996, 553). It says nothing for or against the 
existence of such a creator, but proceeds simply from the existence in 
the world of a being with certain given natural needs. That beings 
quest for a hierarchy of aims is then seen as inquiry into those needs 
and the relation between them. 
     For Aristotle, (1980, 38) reason is central to human nature and that 
is why he defined `man as a rational animal` or an animal that can at 
least be rational. But he placed more emphasis on training (rather than 
curbing) our emotions, so that we automatically react and want to act 
in the best way. Aristotle argued that there are two types of virtue, 
virtues of intellect and virtue of character. A virtue of character is a 
character trait that disposes us to feel desires and emotions ‘well’ 
rather than ‘badly’; by ‘well’, he meant ‘at the right times, with 
reference to the right objects, towards the right people , with the right 
motive and in the right way”. Of the different virtues of intellect –such 
as quick thinking and general intelligences-- the one we are concerned 
with in the ordering of the human society is practical wisdom, for it is 
practical wisdom that allows us to know what is right in each case. 
     A car driver has just deliberately, swerved in front of your friend’s 
car along New Benin-Lagos road. Your friend beeped and the other 
driver has stopped his car, got out, and has started swearing at your 
friend. What’s the right thing to do? You probably feel angry and a bit 
scared. Are you feeling these emotions well? Being angry towards a 
bully who is insulting a friend seems the right thing to do. But your 
anger could be too strong and motivate you to start a fight, in which 
case you are not feeling it in the right way. Or if you are too afraid, 
you might want to say something, but not be able to. To understand the 
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right way to feel anger and fear, we need to understand the situation 
more: was this a once-off, or does this driver generally terrorise the 
neighbourhood? Is this person just a bad driver, or a bully you have 
come across before on other occasions? And to know what to do, you 
need to know yourself: if you say something, will you say it in a way 
that is helpful, or will you just be provocative, making the situation 
worse? Someone who is virtuous also has practical wisdom, which 
Aristotle says only comes with experience, and a wise person 
understands situations and how they develop, and what all the options 
are. 
     The claim that is basic to this Aristotelian view is that it comes 
about because, as human beings, we naturally have certain emotions 
and tendencies, and that it is simply a brute fact (made up of a vastly 
complex set of other facts) that given that we are as we naturally are, 
we can only flourish/be happy/successful by developing those 
character traits that are called the virtues-- courage, justice, 
benevolence (Hursthouse, 2004, 178). Clearly, `virtue ethics` emphasis 
on the personal nature of the moral life has its appeal. The idea that we 
should be good people, not just do the right thing, is a nice one, it 
presents a picture of a world populated by people who are truly 
pleasant, rather than dutiful but nasty (Hursthouse, 179).  
     Let us for a moment examine the argument about some of the above 
mentioned character traits, and what sorts of facts are appealed to. For 
instance, consider one of the simplest cases--generosity. We are 
naturally sociable creatures who like to have friends and want to be 
loved by friends and family. We also like, love and appreciate people 
who go out of their way to help us rather than putting themselves first, 
always first. We also are not merely sympathetic but empathetic: the 
distress of others may distress us and their pleasures may be 
pleasurable to us. Given that this is how we are, someone who is mean 
and egocentric is unlikely to be liked and appreciated and hence likely 
to be lonely and unhappy; someone who is generous is likely to enjoy 
the benefits of being liked and loved and moreover, in the exercise of 
their generosity will derive much added enjoyment, for the pleasures 
of those they benefit will be pleasures to them. 




     Consider case--honesty. Amongst the relevant facts here are some 
that are similar to the preceding ones--that we want friends, want them 
to be trustworthy, want them to trust us–and some that are rather 
different, for instance, that there are likely to be occasions in our lives 
when we need to be believed. Folk wisdom, according to Hursthouse 
(2004, 179) also contains the adage that “honesty is the best policy” 
and the conviction that “the truth will come out” to the discomfort of 
those who have lied. The honest person has the advantage of not 
having to keep a constant guard on her tongue and has peace of mind 
thereby. One should also note that the honest person can tell the truth 
effortlessly in circumstance where it would be embarrassing, 
frightening unpleasant or unfortunately impossible for the person who 
does not have the virtue. Much more could be said here too about the 
harm one does oneself through self-deception and how difficult it is to 
be simultaneously ruthlessly honest with oneself but dishonest to other 
people. 
     Even more than honesty, courage is a character trait one needs to 
arm oneself with, given that we are as we are- subject to death and 
pain and frightened of them. It is not so much that we need courage to 
endure pain and face death as ends in themselves, but that we are likely 
to have to face the threat of pain or danger for the sake of some good 
which we shall otherwise lose. One might imagine that someone in the 
position of the person(...) who had the opportunity to save someone’s 
life by donating the bone marrow and did not do it, was someone who 
saw this as a wonderful opportunity to do good but lacked the courage 
to do it. This might as well be a source of deep regret, and how much 
more better the regret would be if one’s cowardice led to the death of 
someone one loved. If we have managed to make ourselves 
courageous we are ready to save our children from the burning house 
or car at whatever risk to ourselves, to stand up to the terrorists who 
threaten our friend’s lives and to our racist neighbours who are trying 
to hound us and our families from our homes. 
     Now all the above is schematic, we do not pretend to have shown 
conclusively that generosity honesty and courage are necessary for 
ordering the society or if one is to flourish/be (truly) happy/successful, 
and of course much of what we discussed is open to disagreement. 
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     Aristotle virtue theory is not without difficulties and we shall treat 
some objections to it. Contrary to what has been claimed, the virtues 
are surely neither (a) necessary nor (b) sufficient for flourishing/being 
(truly) happy or successful. Not necessary because, as we all know, the 
wicked may flourish like the green bay tree, not sufficient because our 
generosity, honesty and courage  for examples might ,  any one of 
them, lead to our being harmed or indeed to our whole being ruined or 
ended. It is quite possible  to say that it is obviously the case that 
having virtue of generosity, we might fall foul of a lot of people who 
exploit  us and rip us off, or find ourselves poverty stricken . There are 
some sudden financial disaster which might befall many of us, leaving 
the generous in dire straits, where the mean do much better. Just as, in 
the past, people have been burnt at the stake for refusing to lie about 
what they believed, so now, under some regimes people are shut in 
asylums, and subjected to enforced drugging for the same reason, 
while the hypocrites remain free, my courage may lead me to go to the 
defence of someone being attacked in the street but to no avail and 
with the result that I am killed or maimed for life while the coward 
goes through her life untouched. Given these possibilities, how can 
anyone claim that the question ‘How am I to flourish?’ is to be 
honestly answered by saying ‘Be virtuous’? (Hoursthouse, 2004, 180). 
     Power is just as good a bet as virtues, if not a better one, for 
flourishing. If you have power, people will, as a matter of fact, love 
you for that, you will be respected and honoured- and all despite the 
fact that in order to get and maintain power you will undoubtedly have 
to be selfish, dishonest, unjust, callous.... to a certain extent (Lacewuig, 
2005, 57). So the answer to ‘How am I to flourish?’’ should not be 
‘’acquire virtue’’ but ‘’acquire power’’. 
     Another objection to ethics of virtue is that it encourages us to 
neglect ourselves for the sake of others. For women in particular, the 
ethics of virtue/care may endorse the stereotype of self-sacrifice which 
has led women to neglect their own lives in the service of others, or to 
feel guilty, (or perhaps worse, that they are not real women) if they do 
pay more attention to their own projects. While the development of 
character central to virtue ethics is a good thing, critics seem to think, 
developing the wrong virtues will lead to the subjection of the self to 
the demands of others rather than its flourishing. The development of a 




virtue is a matter of habituation, not just an occasional exercise, and so 
the occasions upon which moral self-scrutiny is appropriate are many, 
it is not just occasional actions we need to review–did I give enough 
money to the poor in front of St. Albert’s catholic church? Should I 
have told my friend about his wife’s infidelity? Am I truly generous, or 
do I just do what convention dictates? Am I nice, or just unwilling to 
make waves? Even if one of the virtues you want to pursue is tranquil 
acceptance of the self, introspection is appropriate–am I too concerned 
about my own character, or insufficiently critical? The cultivation of 
virtue is a moral task from which there is no respite.  
     Is this increased evaluation bad? Yes, in two ways. First, the 
practice of evaluation may be alienating. Subjecting yourself to 
scrutiny about what you should want can alienate you from what you 
do want, in a way which makes you lose spontaneity, enjoyment, and 
self knowledge. It is not clear to us whether this is what we do want or 
what we think we should want, whether this is what we are or what we 
think we should be. 
     One result of self–scrutiny may be to show you don’t have a virtue. 
You do the beneficent thing, but without feelings of sympathy or good 
will- you are dragged by the sense that you have to, not by fellow- 
feeling. As the ethics of virtue is construed, you here lack a requisite 
virtue if, on the other hand, you do have all the virtues you think a 
good person should have, your problems may only be beginning. 
Conflicts between virtues can lead us into fragmentation and guilt, and 
such conflicts are likely in all but the most narrowly focused life. In a 
case where the promptings of two virtues conflict, I will be moved to 
act by both. And when I act, in this case of conflict, I will fail in light 
of one virtue even if I succeed in light of the other. Loyalty can require 
we stick up for our friends if I get angry with the driver who insulted 
my friend, is that ‘’too much’’ anger but the right amount of loyalty to 
my friend? But if I don’t get angry, is that ‘’too little’’ loyalty to my 
friend? Even if we can resolve this apparent conflict of virtues, will all 
such conflicts disappear? For example, when someone had done 
something wrong, and we are putting it right, can we show justice and 
mercy , or do we have to choose? (Lacewuig, 2005, 57) 
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     Insofar as the ethics of virtue has been prompted to provide a 
picture of agency which we can use as a realistic moral model, it fails; 
it fails because the ordering of the society for the common good cannot 
be based on the ethics of moderation. Happiness, most often than not, 
does not result from moderate behaviour. There are instances where 
only ‘immoderate’’ behaviour is proper behaviour. A man who is 
temperamentally passionate and romantic may find that ‘’moderate` 
behaviour does not suit him. He cannot be happy if he is forced to 
control himself in all situations of life (Popkin and Stroll, 1974, 22). 
For people of this temperament, the Aristotelian ethic is not an 
appealing one. No wonder, most attempts to extend this to the area of 
ordering of society (Politics) have not met with success. 
 
2(a). Human Nature in Giambattista Vico’s New Science 
Vico’s description of human nature is apt. His treatment of human 
behaviour is exact. That men’s corrupted nature places them under the 
tyranny of self-love cannot be doubted. This nature compels them to 
make private utility their chief guide, seeking everything useful for 
themselves and nothing for their companions. They cannot even bring 
their passions under control to direct them towards justice. 
     Vico cites the examples of man in his early bestial state to 
corroborate his description. He desires only his own welfare having 
taken wife and begotten children, he discusses his own welfare along 
with that of the family, having entered upon civil life, he desires his 
own welfare along with that of his city, when its rule is extended over 
several peoples, he desires his own welfare along with that of the 
nation, when the nations are united by wars, treaties of peace, 
alliances, and commerce, he desires his own welfare along with that of 
the entire human race. In all these circumstances, says Vico, man 
desires principally his own utility (Sasa, 2001, 160). 
     It is clear from all the above that man’s nature is corrupt and he acts 
only for self-love and for his own utility (Sasa, 161). What he takes to 
be his utility in this case would largely depend upon the various and 
ever changing institutional roles he assumes .Thus: 
(1) When he is father, (i.e., the quasi-monarchical leader 
of a primitive tribe or family’) he identifies his 
interests with those of his kin; 




(2) When he is a citizen , he identifies them with those of 
  his city; and  
(3) When a national; he identifies with those of his nation 
  (Vico, 1988, 175). 
 
     In Vico’s view legislation considers man as he is in order to turn 
him to good use in human society. He spots three vices which run 
throughout the human race. They are  
(a) Ferocity 
(b) Avarice 
(c) Ambition  
     Out of these three vices, legislation creates the military, merchants 
and governing classes. Dangerous as these vices are still, therein laid 
the strength, riches, wisdom of common wealth. This is not the only 
paradox in this case; Vico also notices that legislation makes civil 
happiness out of these same three great vices which he concludes 
could certainly destroy all mankind on the face of the earth.  Here  it is 
pertinent to point out that Vico seems to contradict himself here, in 
that he seems to suggest that legislation is an extra-human agency 
compelling man to live in society  against his nature and thus, that it is 
contingent that man should live in this way. 
     In sum, Vico is concerned about man’s crude and selfish nature. 
While it is true that man wants to live in society, he wants it so because 
he needs others to realise himself. He observed that in his limitations, 
man is selfish and self-centred. Law (man-made) is therefore to assist 
him (man) to harmonise his behaviour in accordance with the common 
interests of the society. If man were left to himself, he would hardly 
think of others. He could over-claim his rights, forgetting sometimes 
that others have some rights too. Vico`s citation of the three vices is an 
example to demonstrate this. Law, in his case, is not an extra human 
but human agency to assist man fit into society where there are varied 
and diverse interests. It is all an internal arrangement. This does not 
mean that there is nothing good in man. Certainly, there is, but it is 
heavily coated with, selfish interests. Vico therefore concludes: “...To 
be useful to the human race, philosophy must raise and direct weak 
128  Human Nature, ‘Dirty Hands’ and Social Disorder 
and fallen man, not rend his or abandon him in his corruption” (Vico, 
176).                             
 
2(b). Human Nature in the Light of Hobbes’ Thought 
Thomas Hobbes is best known as a philosopher of Human Nature and 
Human Society. He is famous for maintaining that the natural 
condition of people is one of war, in which life is ‘solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish and short’, and he was an early social contract theorist: he 
believed that the state could be understood as the outcome of an 
agreement between free human beings to submit to Government. 
     ‘’De Cive’’ was published in 1642, two years after the elements of 
law, and nearly nine years before appearance of Leviathan. It opens 
with a strong denial of one of the cardinal principles of  Aristotle’s 
politics, that humans are by nature cut out for life in the ‘polis’. 
According to Hobbes, human beings are not naturally made for the 
political life. 
They think too much of themselves, put too 
much values on present gratification, and 
they are bad at predicting the                           
consequences of their actions. One effect of 
these tendencies is for people to come into 
conflict with one another, especially                           
when they feel that they are undervalued in 
other people’s eyes (Sorell, 1966, 531).  
 
     The conflict can consist of the denigration of one person in the 
conversation of another person, or it can take the form of outright 
quarrelling and even violence. And if these are familiar patterns of 
behaviours when there is law and custom and good manners to restrain 
people, how much more extreme must the hostility be when these 
things are absent and naked human nature is allowed to express itself 
without interference? For Hobbes, left to do what comes naturally, 
human beings would quickly find themselves in a state of war or as 
Hobbes puts it, life in the state of nature is war –the anti-social 
condition par excellence (Sorell, 532). 
     Hobbes solution is strong government, strong laws and transfer of 
the right of nature to a sovereign power. Most countries in the world 




today, have strong government and strong laws but the question is has 
human nature been changed? From the reality on the ground, 
politically and socially speaking, attempts to change human nature for 
the better through imposition of education, right conduct and rule of 
law have not met with success. What seems to characterise all nation- 
states presently is a return to the state of nature where politics is 
synonymous with ‘’Dirty hands’’ and man’s inhumanity to man. 
 
2(c) Human Nature and Machiavellian Challenge 
Politics, in the sense of ordering of the state, has always posed 
threatening questions about the scope and authority of common 
understandings of morality. It is politics that Thrasymachus has 
foremost in mind, in Plato’s Republic, when he challenges Socrates to 
refute his startling definition of justice as ‘’ the interest of the 
stronger’’. In a similarly deflationary spirit, some modern political 
theorists and advisers seems to think that political realism implies that 
moral considerations have no place at all in politics. Those who refer 
to the necessities of politics have, at least since Machiavelli, often 
thereby signified not only necessary risks of an apparently immoral 
kind but necessary lies, cruelties and even murders. Taking their lead 
from Sartre’s play of the same name, modern philosophers tend to talk 
of the necessity for ‘’dirty hands’’ in politics, meaning that the 
vocation of politics somehow rightly requires its practitioners to 
violate important moral standards which prevail outside politics. 
     It is not clear that Machiavelli would have disagreed. He is writing 
for and about rulers and their advisers, and so his emphasis is heavily 
political, but, at least sometimes he writes as though the need for ‘dirty 
hands’ is part of the human rather than the political condition. 
     Notoriously, there is a great   deal of controversy about the 
interpretation of Machiavelli’s own views. We believe that his 
advocacy of ‘necessary immorality’ is perfectly serious, and that , 
although he has in mind the need to override Christian morality, the 
point has wider application to moral codes and virtues that are 
recognised in secular and other contexts beyond Christianity. When 
Machiavelli says` a man who wishes to profess goodness at all time 
will come to ruin among so many who are not so good. Hence it is 
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necessary for a prince who wishes to maintain his position to learn 
how not to be good, and to use this knowledge or not to use it 
according to necessity (Machiavelli, 1513, 52). Thus he is genuinely 
challenging a very deep and compelling pictures of morality. 
According to this picture, we can understand what it is to lead a good 
life in terms of virtues and/ or the duties of a moral code, and such an 
understanding provides us with final, authoritative guidance on how to 
act. Moral reason may not always have something to say to us about 
our choices and decision but when it does intervene seriously and 
relevantly it must carry the day against all competing considerations. 
This picture is however, challenged by Machiavelli because he thinks 
that there are powerful reasons which can and should overrule the 
moral reasons. Machiavelli explicitly casts doubt upon the unity of the 
virtues, at one point, when he insists that it is not possible (especially 
for a prince) to observe all the virtues because the human condition 
does not permit it (Machiavelli, 52).   
     Hence, doing ‘’the right thing’’ in politics will really sometimes 
mean cultivating what is a genuine human vice. Some contemporary 
political philosophers argue in favour of their view that there is 
something special about politics that licenses Machiavellian 
conclusions, the modern Machiavellians urge or assumes several 
considerations. Here are a few considerations gathered from their 
writings. The ‘necessity’ to manipulate, lie, betray, steal or kill may 
arise in private life occasionally but it is much more frequent in 
politics. 
     The political arena involves choices and consequences of much 
greater weight than does private life. Actors in political life are 
representatives and so need to be morally assessed in a different way. 
This point is often underpinned by some appeal to role morality. 
Relatively, much is made by some writers (Thomas Nagel comes 
particularly to mind) of the dominance of considerations of 
impartiality in the morality appropriate to politics. Nagel thinks that 
this fact underpins the legitimacy we accord to the state’s resorts to 
violence in contrasts to the way we frown upon such resort by the 
individual citizens. Nagel here is in accord with Machiavelli who 
stated it point blank in the Discourses that it is legitimate in political 
arena to use an immoral means to achieve a good end. However, the 




end which Machiavelli has in mind is the security and the welfare of 
the state. The case of violence, as distinctive of the political, may serve 
as an illustration. It is often suggested that where it would be wrong for 
citizens to use violence or the threat of it in their dealings with other 
citizens, it can be right for their political representative to use it on 
their behalf. One of the most plausible routes to the legitimacy of the 
state`s employment of violence is through ‘the domestic analogy ‘of an 
individual`s right to self-defence but the implication may be weaker; 
certainly, state agents are entitled to use or authorise violence where an 
individual isn’t. 
     Thomas Nagel puts this frequently in discussing the issues of 
taxation and conscription. As he says of taxation: “if someone with an 
income of $2,000 a year turns a gun on someone with an income of 
$100,000 a year and makes him handover his wallet, that is robbery. if 
the federal government withholds a portion of the second person’s 
salary (enforcing the laws against tax evasion with threats of 
imprisonment under armed guard) and gives some of it to the first 
person in the form of welfare payments, food stamps, or free health 
care , that is taxation” (Nagel, 1978, 55).  He goes on to state that the 
former is morally impermissible and the latter morally legitimate, 
claiming that this is a case in which public morality is not `derived` 
from private morality but `from impersonal conseqentialist 
considerations`. 
     Nagel’s general position is that political morality differs from 
private morality in allowing much more weight to conseqentialist 
thinking whereas private morality is more agent-centred. The 
interpretation of this idea, in ‘strict sense’, involves ‘’dirty hands’’ 
implications. And Machiavelli’s view may not be acceptable to us 
today, theoretically speaking, but following the epiphany of human 
nature `hic et nunce`, the reality  on the ground seems to justify his 
views. 
 
3. Evaluation: Implications for Nigerian Socio-Political Situtation 
Our country Nigeria and the continent of Africa at large, is ravaged by 
socio-political, economic and religious problems stemming from false 
ideological foundation of our polity. In the first place, there is false 
132  Human Nature, ‘Dirty Hands’ and Social Disorder 
interpretation of human nature in the sense of elevating it to a pedestal 
where it does not belong, secondly, there is too much insistence on the 
normative role on how to order the society so that the common good 
could be realised, contrary to the normal manifestation of human 
condition as condition-sini-qua-non for social order. Thirdly, attempts 
so far to employ various methods towards solving the problem of 
governance and fellowship have not met with success as human nature 
continues to manifest its ugly cum beautiful faces on daily basis. 
     It is pertinent to observe, that there is no law greater than the Ten 
Commandments and yet people break them on daily basis with 
impunity. The prisons are overflowing with citizens whose human 
nature could not be checkmated by social conventions of the state. 
Some are by nature psychopaths, neurotic, and kleptomania and 
recently we have started hearing stories of people who lay claims to 
lesbianism and gay on grounds of nature (this certainly is going to 
change our definition of marriage institutions and its interpretation). 
     Within the context of politics in Nigeria and most countries of the 
world, ‘dirty hands’ politics has become its major characteristics. For 
instances , public officials are no longer particularly circumspect about 
the giving and receiving of gifts, rulers do take money from citizens, 
by threat of violence if necessary on grounds of  money laundering or 
economic financial crime. In Nigeria today, we have cultivated the 
culture of ‘ten percent; family patronage, encouragement of the 
advancement of political friends or cronies, exploitation of political 
position for personal profit, encouragement of cult of mediocrity. It is 
true that the exploitation of political position for whatever reasons is 
strongly disapproved of in many cultures (though consistently 
practised in both direct and indirect ways). Furthermore, there is the 
recalcitrant fact, for  the impartiality thesis, that Nigerian politicians 
are widely regarded as being correctly influenced by considerations of 
partiality that differ only in scale from those of the private citizen. 
     Political leaders are thought to have special obligations to their 
nation, their ethnic race. The impartiality thesis based upon the 
application of rigorous moral principle is not convincing (Lafollette, 
2007, 328) and if we may add a figment in the imagination of those 
who are not interested on ‘real- politik’. 




     A more general difficulty confronts all of these arguments as they 
rely upon common features of political behaviour, and that is the way 
in which any thesis about ‘’dirty hands’’ and the special  nature of 
political morality has to come to terms  with the fact that political 
environments are so often morally corrupt. The Psalmist warns against 
putting one’s trust in princes (Ps.146:3) and the prophet Micah speaks 
for many when he says; ‘’that they may do evil with both hands 
earnestly, the prince asketh, and the judge asketh for a reward, and the 
great man he ultereth his mischievous desires (Micah 7:3). The point is 
not just that ‘power tends to corrupt; though it does, but that the values 
which politicians find themselves driven to promote , and others find 
themselves driven to endorse, may be the product of degraded social 
circumstances and arrangements (Coady, 1992, 379). Both Rousseau 
and Marx have pertinent remarks to make here, as well as the prophets 
of an earlier day. This may suggest that philosophers and other 
theorists have in fact been too complacent in their acceptance of the 
neutrality and immutability of the back ground circumstances which 
generate ‘dirty hands’ choices. Roberts Fullinwider once remarked that 
we need politicians just as we need garbage collectors, and in both 
cases we should expect them to stink but, once upon a time, we needed 
the services of the collectors of what was euphemistically called ‘night 
soil men’ and, in many parts of the world, human ingenuity has 
eliminated the need for that very malodorous occupation. 
 
Conclusion 
The  insights from Aristotle, Vico, Hobbes and Machiavelli  have 
given us a deep understanding of human nature  and why and how men 
behave the way they do and its implications  on the ‘’Politics  and the 
problem of dirty hands’’ on the social order or disorder in the society. 
Machiavelli emphasises on what he calls the moral isolation, though 
often ignored by his commentators, and it is of considerable 
independent interest for discussion of collaborative action. It is the 
problem posed by the demands of virtue in a world or context 
dominated by evildoers. He <and later, Hobbes> thought it folly to 
behave virtuously in such a situation. 
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     The insight behind the accusation of folly is that there is some 
fundamental point to morality which is undermined by the widespread 
non-co-operation of others for both Machiavelli and Hobbes; it is a 
kind of survival. The survival of the state and all it stands for 
(including a sort of glory) is pre-eminent in Machiavelli, where as the 
individual`s self-preservation is Hobbes principal focus, though each 
shares something of the others concerns. There are obvious advantages 
in various virtuous acts, in various informal conventions, for instance, 
that dictate waiting in queues (or line) for the availability of certain 
goods and these advantages are sufficiently important for most of us to 
keep conforming in the face of the occasional queue jumper. When, 
however, civilization has so deteriorated that the majority are queue 
jumpers the advantages can no longer be achieved for anyone by 
continued minority compliance. We must look to other methods, such 
as laws or violence, to protect the ill, the weak and the non-assertive. 
     We must stress finally that the conceptions of human nature differ, 
how society can be ordered equally is not one-dimensional, but the 
politics of ‘dirty hands‘ has become part and parcel of the human 
condition; and this is particularly true of contemporary Nigerian socio-
politics. We can manage it, we can fight to stop some of its undesirable 
consequences, but above all we must learn how to live with this 
necessary evil despite the fact that Aquinas maintains that it is contrary 
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